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LAY DIVORCE FIRMS AND THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Effective January 1, 1972, Michigan adopted a no-fault divorce
law.1 Since that time, at least two firms in the Detroit area have
gone into the business of providing assistance to people wishing to
process their own divorces.2 These enterprises, which have been
dubbed divorce firms or divorce kit firms, 3 have come under
heavy attack from the organized bar. The State Bar of Michigan
has instituted court proceedings against one firm for the unau-
thorized practice of law, 4 and a court on its own initiative has
already issued an injunction against the other. 5
These cases raise two important issues: whether the divorce
firms are guilty of the unauthorized practice of law, and if they are
and may therefore be enjoined from continuing their operations,
whether to do so is in the public interest. As to the first of these
issues, it is likely that on the basis of present law these firms may
successfully be prosecuted for unauthorized practice.6 It is far
less clear that this result is a desirable one. Evaluations of this
sort should be made by weighing both the costs and the benefits
flowing from the operation of lay divorce firms and from the
prohibition of such firms. 7 On the basis of such an analysis this
article offers several suggestions for a new approach to divorce
firms and the unauthorized practice of law. 8
'MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1972) (originally enacted as 25 P.A. 1971,
No. 75, § I). The law is quoted in part at note 76 infra. The term "no-fault" refers to a
divorce law which is based solely on the breakdown of the marital relationship, as opposed
to a "fault" law which conditions the granting of a divorce on proof of one spouse's
misconduct (e.g., adultery).
2 The two firms are Harry Gordon & Associates in Oakland County (suburban Detroit)
and Gordon, Graham & Cramer in Detroit. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. I, 1972, at 3A,
col. 5.
3 Harry Gordon & Associates actually did have a kit which was sold to couples seeking
divorces. The other firm, Gordon, Graham & Cramer, utilizes a series of interviews and
has no actual kit. See notes 44 and 45 infra.4 The State Bar of Michigan v. Harold Graham, No. 72-218571-C2 (Wayne County Cir.
Ct., filed Sept. 27, 1972).
'Bales v. Bales, No. 72-87626 (Oakland County Cir. Ct., Aug. 23, 1972). This was a
divorce case involving clients of Harry Gordon & Associates. Judge William J. Beer, on
his own motion, found Harry Gordon in contempt of court for practicing law without a
license and issued a permanent restraining order prohibiting him from providing assistance
in divorce cases.
6 See part I B 2 infra.
' See part II C 3 infra.
8 See part I I I infra.
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I. DIVORCE FIRMS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW:
LEGAL ISSUES
A. The Present State of the Law
Governing Unauthorized Practice
At common law the determination of who was qualified to
practice law was wholly within the power of the courts. 9 This
heritage has been preserved in this country within the con-
stitutional framework of the separation of powers, with the
judiciary generally claiming an inherent power to control partici-
pants in the legal process. 10 Nevertheless, all states in the ex-
ercise of their police powers also regulate the practice of law by
statute.1' Although there have been occasional conflicts between
these sources of authority,12 the courts appear for the most part to
have gratefully accepted this legislative assistance in regulating
the legal profession,' 3 while retaining the right to act apart from
statute if necessary.' 4 Even the statutes, however, generally give
9 This judicial authority dates at least to 1292, when a statute of Edward I directed the
justices of the Court of Common Pleas to appoint a certain number of "attorneys and
lawyers" who might serve in court, and that only they and no others should practice. See
Vom Baur, An Historical Sketch of the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 24 UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE NEWS, Fall, 1958, I, 3; i F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, I THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 216 (2d ed. 1968). The statute of 4 Hen. IV, ch. 18 (1402) confirmed that
the judiciary was to have total discretion in determining who was qualified to practice in
the common law courts, presumably on the grounds that they were officers of the court and
of the King.
10 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION PROJECT ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW,
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK 1-4 (1961) [hereinafter cited as UNAU-
THORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK]. This view has been adopted in Michigan. See, e.g.,
Ayres v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 596-98, 6 N.W.2d 905, 907-08 (1942).
1" UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK, supra note 10, at 5 and passim (catalog-
ing statutes).
12 Legislative attempts at regulating the practice of law have occasionally been held to
violate the doctrine of separation of powers under state constitutions. Application of
Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App.
1936); Application of Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959); In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla.
264, 97 P.2d 556 (1939); In the Matter of Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P.2d 651 (1945); In
re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935). This last
case was an advisory opinion by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court holding that
parts of a proposed statute which permitted the practice of law by lay organizations or
persons in certain limited fields constituted an invalid invasion of the judiciary's right to
control legal practice.
13 See, e.g., 3 MICH. LAW & PRACTICE, Attorneys & Counselors § 2, at 225 (1956):
"Notwithstanding this inherent power of the Supreme Court, it has been generally con-
ceded that the legislature may prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the licensing
of attorneys which will be followed by the court," citing In re Bonam, 255 Mich. 59, 237
N.W. 45 (1931); In re Alexander, 167 Mich. 495, 133 N.W. 491 (1911).
14 "Some states have determined that the legislature in the exercise of its police powers
may pass statutes setting minimum standards so as to aid the judiciary in regulating the
practice of law, although the legislature cannot exclude the judiciary from this power."
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK, supra note 10, at I (footnote omitted, empha-
sis in original).
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the courts much discretion in their policing of unauthorized prac-
tice, 15 and the area remains very much within the judicial domain.
In a majority of jurisdictions, including Michigan, the statutory
scheme for restricting legal practice involves the establishment of
an integrated bar. 16 The Michigan statute authorizes the state
supreme court to provide for the organization and regulation of
the bar1 7 and permits legal practice only in accordance with the
rules so promulgated.' 8 Persons engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law are guilty of contempt of court and may be pun-
ished accordingly.19 Although the Michigan statute, unlike many
others, does not explicitly authorize any particular form of relief,
it appears that, in addition to the more common means for re-
dressing contempt, the courts will grant injunctions against un-
authorized practitioners.20
The Michigan statute regulating the unauthorized practice of
law does not specify who may seek enforcement of its provisions,
although certain limitations on proper parties are suggested by the
nature of the available remedies. Most common is a suit by or on
behalf of a bar association seeking injunctive relief to prevent the
defendant from continuing his activities. The supreme court's
Rules Concerning the State Bar of Michigan give the Bar the
power "to investigate matters pertaining to the unauthorized prac-
tice of law and, with the authority of its board of commissioners,
Is For example, the Michigan statute provides:
It is unlawful for any person to practice law, or to engage in the law business,
or in any manner whatsoever to lead others to believe that he is authorized to
practice law or to engage in the law business, or in any manner whatsoever to
represent or designate himself as an attorney and counselor, attorney at law,
or lawyer, unless the person so doing is regularly licensed and authorized to
practice law in this state....
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.9 16 (1968). The determination of what acts constitute
practicing law is apparently left to the courts.
16 The term "integrated bar" refers to the situation where all persons licensed to practice
law are members of the bar association, or alternatively, where only members of the bar
may practice law. As of 1961 the American Bar Foundation noted twenty-nine out of
fifty-four jurisdictions surveyed have integrated bars. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE
BOOK, supra note 10, at 5- 16. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.901 (1968) provides:
The state bar of Michigan is a public body corporate, the membership of
which consists of all persons who are now and hereafter licensed to practice
law in this state. The members of the state bar of Michigan are officers of the
courts of this state, and have the exclusive right to designate themselves as
"attorneys and counselors," or "attorneys at law," or "lawyers." No person
is authorized to practice law in this state unless he complies with the require-
ments of the supreme court with regard thereto.
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.904 (1968).
18 Id. § 600.901.
9 Id. § 600.9 16.
20 Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance System, Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23
(1956); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939);
Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365 (1937).
See also In re Albert, 383 Mich. 722, 179 N.W.2d 20 (1970), which held that a court may
,initiate contempt proceedings on its own motion.
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to file and prosecute actions and proceedings with regard to such
matters." 21 The importance attached by the State Bar to the
control of unauthorized practice is indicated by the existence of a
standing committee whose sole purpose is to perform this func-
tion. 22 It is with this committee in particular, and the State Bar in
general, that primary responsibility rests for the prosecution of
v olators. 23
It is conceivable that an unauthorized practice case could also
be brought by a party not acting on behalf of a bar association.
Such cases are, however, not likely to occur with any frequency
because, as a practical matter, the plaintiff would have little or
nothing to gain in an ordinary unauthorized practice suit, the
available relief being an injunction, a contempt conviction, or
both-.24 Although unauthorized practice has on occasion been
successfully raised as a defense to a suit brought to collect a fee, 25
it is probable that most cases will result from the initiative of the
organized bar or the courts themselves.
Because the practice of law has been limited to members of the
bar, thereby making legitimate practitioners readily identifiable,
the primary issue in any unauthorized practice case is whether the
accused nonlawyer has engaged in activities properly constituting
the practice of law. The formidable task of constructing a defini-
tion of the practice of law has largely been left to the judiciary,
21 RULE 18, RULES CONCERNING THE STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, in MICHIGAN COURT
RULES (Supp. 1972). These are the rules formulated by the supreme court pursuant to
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.904 (1968).
22 Bylaws of the State Bar of Michigan, 45 MICH. ST. B.J., June, 1966, at 40. Art. VII,
§ 2(g) of the bylaws reads:
Unauthorized Practice of Law.
It shall be the duty of this committee to study and report to the State Bar
from time to time on unauthorized practice of the law in Michigan, and to
investigate into, and to take or cause to be taken, in accordance with Rule 17,
all steps necessary or desirable to prevent the unauthorized practice of the
law and to punish or discipline those engaged in or contributing to such
practice. It shall cooperate with local bar associations engaged in similar
activity.
23 Smith, Investigation of Unauthorized Practice of Law by Omnibus Proceeding: The
Ohio Method, 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 199 (1964); RULE 18, RULES CON-
CERNING THE STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, in MICHIGAN COURT RULES (Supp. 1972); ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 3-5.
24 Injunctions and punishment for contempt are the normal remedies for unauthorized
practice. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra. Unauthorized practice might be
raised in a tort suit for damages (e.g., plaintiff relied on defendant's erroneous advice and
suffered a loss as a result). Nevertheless, if the suit alleged no personal damages, the
plaintiff would merely be suing on behalf of the public and would gain little or nothing from
the outcome of his action.
25 E.g., Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. I, 247 N.W. 97 (1933). A nonlaw-
yer solicited a personal injury case and then found a lawyer to handle it. The lawyer was
denied recovery of his fee because he was acting in concert with the nonlawyer, who was
guilty of unauthorized practice.
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which has developed a substantial body of case law on the sub-
ject.
When formulating their tests in terms of abstract principles,
courts have generally employed operational definitions, consid-
ering the practice of law to consist of those tasks traditionally
performed by attorneys. For example, judicial opinions have
found unauthorized practice of law to include activities such as
the "giving of legal advice and the preparation of wills, contracts,
and other legal instruments,- 2 6 or "making it a business to prac-
tice as an attorney-at-law not being a lawyer." 27
Broad definitions such as these obviously leave the concept of
unauthorized practice in a rather malleable state. Despite a wealth
of cases considering a wide variety of specific activities, 28 no
more useful standards have emerged. It is universally acknowl-
edged that the practice of law is not limited to that which takes
place within the confines of the courtroom. 29 Activities such as
the drafting of wills, the preparation of pleadings, and even the
mere giving of advice in a specific situation have been held to
constitute the unauthorized practice of law when performed by
nonlawyers. 30
While one commentator has concluded, perhaps too harshly,
that "[a] literal interpretation of such... broad definition[s] would
leave virtually no commercial area of human endeavor un-
26 Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
27 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 338, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919).
28 See generally the cases cited in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION PROJECT ON THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK, 67-86 (S.
Bass ed. 1965).
2 It is too obvious for discussion that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in courts. According to the generally understood definition
of the practice of law in this country, it embraces the preparation of plead-
ings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and, in addition, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and, in general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney at law is one
who engages in any of these branches of the practice of law.
In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909).30 See, e.g., Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940) (defendant enjoined from giving information on estates,
taxes, and trusts as well as from preparing release of deed of trust forms and tax returns);
Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939) (defendant's
practice of examining title abstracts, drawing up leases, land contracts, deeds, and mort-
gages, and occasionally drawing up a will held to be the unauthorized practice of law);
People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919) (defendant who made a business of
drawing up legal instruments and papers for profit guilty of unauthorized practice); In re
Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909) (defendant who had been previously disbarred
convicted of unauthorized practice for accepting employment which constituted attempting
to secure the release of a man in prison).
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touched,"3 1 the scope of such definitions is potentially very wide.
In an attempt to rationalize the doctrine's operation, the definition
of legal practice has been narrowed by the carving out of ex-
ceptions, three of which arguably pertain to divorce firms. The
first of these, which represents a balancing of the public's right to
protection from incompetent practitioners and the individual's
right to freedom of speech,3 2 exempts from the prohibition of
unauthorized practice those cases in which the personal attor-
ney-client relationship is lacking. In New York County Lawyers'
Association v. Dacey,33 for example, the Court of Appeals of
New York reversed a lower court decision enjoining publication
of the book How to Avoid Probate and adopted the dissenting
opinion of Justice Stevens of the Appellate Division stating that:
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relationship of confidence and trust
so necessary to the status of attorney and client. This is the
essential of legal practice-the representation and the advis-
ing of a particular person in a particular situation.3 4
A second exception, taking into account the interests of con-
venience and business efficiency, allows nonlawyers to perform
occasional legal services when such services are only incidental to
their main businesses and are not performed for profit. In State ex
rel. Indiana State Bar Association v. Indiana Real Estate Associ-
ation,3 5 the court authorized real estate brokers to fill out pre-
pared legal forms:
It cannot be urged, with reason, that a lawyer must preside
over every transaction where written legal forms must be
selected and used by an agent acting for one of the parties.
Such a restriction would so paralyze business activities that
very few transactions could be expeditiously consum-
mated....
31 Note, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 319, 329 (1969).
32 For a consideration of the impact of the first amendment on restrictions against the
unauthorized practice of law, see Comment, 2 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 281, 282 (1971).
a321 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967). The defendant had
previously been enjoined in Connecticut from continuing his practice of distributing a
pamphlet advising readers on probate problems and then giving individual advice in
personal interviews. He then moved to New York and expanded his pamphlet into a book
entitled How to A void Probate.
34 In the Matter of New York County Lawyers' Ass'n. v. Dacey, 28 App. Div. 161,
174, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 998 (1967).
35 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963). Suit was brought by the bar association to
enjoin the defendant real estate brokers from filling in the blanks in real estate documents
which had been prepared by attorneys. The court sanctioned the completion of simple
forms where it would be a great inconvenience to require that a lawyer make the entries.
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The possibility of an occasional improvident act in the use of
such forms may not, with reason, be made the basis for
denying the right to perform the same act in a thousand
instances where the public convenience and necessity would
seem to require itP6
This exception has been narrowly construed by the courts. The
legal work must be clearly incidental to one's primary occupation
and done only as a matter of convenience.3 7 Even incidental legal
services may be prohibited if the nature of the work is too com-
plex.3 8
A third exception, again based upon considerations of public
convenience, would permit lay persons to render assistance in
legal matters where such activity appears to be consistent with a
legislative purpose in a specific area. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in American Automobile
Association, Inc. v. Merrick,3 9 sanctioned the automobile club's
practice of having lay employees assist members in filing claims in
small claims court because "[t]o prohibit appellant's lay employ-
ees from filling out and filing these papers would be inconsistent
with the spirit of the Act."'40 This exception, however, has not
found favor with other courts. 1
The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on the premise that the public is entitled to protection
from unskilled and unscrupulous practitioners. 42 The exceptions
38 d. at 221, 191 N.E.2dat715.
37 Id. See also Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 217, 69
N.W.2d 713, 715 (1955), where two Michigan corporations were found not guilty of the
unauthorized practice of law for filling out "standard printed forms of agreements of
purchase and sale, deeds, land contracts, mortgages, assignments of mortgages, notices to
quit, et cetera..." for which they did not charge any fee additional to their standard fee
for handling the transaction; Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271
(D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940), where defendant was enjoined from
giving information on estates, taxes, and trusts and preparing release of deed of trust forms
and tax returns; Detroit Bar Ass'n. v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 230, 276
N.W. 365, 370 (1937), where the circuit court enjoined the defendant from
performing any act or drawing any paper (which would otherwise constitute
the practice of law) in connection with the administration of any estate in the
probate court or any other court except the same be ordinary or incidental
services for which no charge is made or fee claimed.
38 State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n., Inc., 244 Ind.
214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 7 11, 715 (1963).
39 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), modifying 31 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1940).
40 117 F.2d at 25.
41 No other case has been found where a court permitted a lay person or organization to
perform legal services because it was consistent with a legislative purpose at least in the
absence of an express provision permitting such activity. Note also that In re Opinion of
the Justices to the Senate, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935), declared that the
legislature was without power to authorize nonlawyers to perform acts where the judiciary
declared those acts to be the unauthorized practice of law.42 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919); Comment, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Associations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 133 I
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to unauthorized practice represent situations in which the poten-
tial harm to the public from such activities is relatively slight. In
considering future cases it will be important to remember that
these are only narrow exceptions to the broad general prohibition
against the performance of legal services by laymen, and such
exceptions will not be recognized by the courts if the potential
public harm is too great.
B. The Status of Divorce Kits
Under Present Law
1. Divorce Firms and Their Operation43 -The two Detroit
firms represent the two main approaches to lay divorce assis-
tance: one operates strictly through a prepared kit and offers no
personalized counseling; 44 and the other employs a series of per-
sonal interviews with the client. 5 The self-contained kit which
includes all necessary forms and accompanying instructions is
probably the simplest format for providing divorce advice. Inevi-
tably, however, the difficulties involved in anticipating and provid-
ing for a broad range of individual problems restrict the utility of
such a kit and create certain dangers for the untrained layman. A
kit, no matter how well written, cannot provide for all potential
difficulties involved in a divorce proceeding. The detection of
problem areas requires interpretation as well as observation of the
facts. Thus, while the client may look at the facts objectively, he
may still fail to understand their legal implications. There are
occasions upon which the presence of an expert is required in
order to discern problems which are not readily apparent to a
layman. The untrained individual proceeding without personal
advice from an experienced counselor could overlook any number
of potential problems, some of which could conceivably result in
(1966); Note, Law Clerks and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 46 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
214 (1969); Report of the Standing Committee on -Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 66
A.B.A. REP. 268 (1941).
43 Much of the data for this section was obtained in an interview with Mr. Harold
Graham of Gordon, Graham & Cramer, in Detroit, Mich., Nov. 30, 1972.
"Harry Gordon & Associates sold a kit which contained copies of all the necessary
forms and instructions on how to complete and file them. Once the client purchased the
kit, there was no further contact with the firm. Another such kit is available through the
mails from J. Lawrence Publications of Pompano Beach, Fla.
45 Gordon, Graham & Cramer conducts a series of four interviews with the client. The
first interview is introductory; at this time the client fills out an application and the
counselor explains that he is not an attorney. At the second interview the complaint is
drafted, and at the third the motion for default judgment is prepared. The final appointment




the loss of legal rights. 46 Alternatively, the client may see as a
major difficulty something which an advisor would know is minor
and easily remediable, such as failure to file proof of service prior
to trial.
Finally, one must not underestimate the value of personal ad-
vice and emotional support that an impartial advisor can provide
in a divorce case. The events leading to divorce are generally
traumatic for the parties, and lawyers who handle divorce cases
often characterize their role as being more than that of a legal
advisor because of the emotional problems involved.47 If a person
performs his own divorce, he must face a system of courts and
procedures which are both alien and probably somewhat for-
bidding to him. The lack of a knowledgeable and sympathetic
advisor who will discuss apprehensions and answer questions can
only serve to increase the client's anxiety and uncertainty as well
as increase the likelihood of mistakes that a trained counselor, not
personally involved in the litigation, would be able to avoid. Of
course, such advice must be paid for,48 and if a party wishes to
forego it, perhaps he should be allowed to do so. Nevertheless,
there is a substantial danger that individuals whose cases are too
complex to be handled with a kit may attempt to do so anyway,
either out of ignorance or out of a simple desire to save money.
The second type of firm attempts to alleviate some of these
problems by means of a series of personal interviews. At each
interview the client fills out certain forms which are to be filed,
and each step of the procedure is explained to him. This is
intended to allay his fears and to enable him to do a better job of
processing his own divorce. By the time the client's case goes to
court, his work has been checked and he understands what is
going to take place in the courtroom.49 If anything unexpected
46 A spouse might give up an extremely important right (e.g., visitation rights) in the
mistaken belief that it is not truly essential in settling the matter in court. Even if the client
recognizes a problem, it may be one which he is unable to solve on his own. An example of
this is a case handled by Gordon, Graham & Cramer. According to Mr. Graham, the judge
agreed to grant the divorce if the husband sold his car and shared the proceeds with his
wife. However, the husband's remaining payments on the car amounted to more than the
fair market value of the car by several hundred dollars. The client, with Mr. Graham's
assistance, drafted an agreement stating that he would sell the car if he could get a price
which exceeded the total of his remaining payments. The judge accepted this agreement.
41 See Usdin, Marital Problems and the Attorney, 12 LOYOLA L. REv. 9 (1965); Foley.
Lawy'er's Role in Domestic Relation Cases, 36 OKLA. B.A.J. 2377 (1965).
48 In 1966, the Michigan State Bar Association's recommended minimum fee for han-
dling an uncontested divorce without property settlement and where there were no chil-
dren involved was $250. Suggested Minimumn Fee Schedule Revised as ofAugust 1, 1966,
45 MICH. ST. B.J., Aug., 1966, 37. Lay divorce firms, by contrast, usually charge between
fifty and one hundred dollars per divorce.
49 At Gordon. Graham & Cramer, the client's last interview is held immediately prior to
his court appearance. The client is told what will happen in court, and he is given a form
which he will read as his testimony.
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happens, the advisor tries to help the client find a solution. If he is
unable to do so, the client is referred to an attorney. 50
Assuming the lay advisor is well trained in divorce law,5 1 this
type of operation is far superior to that of the kit. Although the
advisor is not an attorney, he should be able to discern and
dispose of problems with which the client alone is simply not
equipped to cope. 52 He has sufficient background to know wheth-
er the case as a whole is of a routine type which can be properly
handled by the divorce firm, or whether the complexities of the
case make it advisable that the client consult an attorney. 53
2. Divorce Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law- In
an unauthorized practice case, the court's first task is to decide
whether the activity in question constitutes the practice of law.
The basis is whether the activity has traditionally been within the
attorney's function. 54 Divorce, originally within the province of
the church, has long been a subject of civil law; 55 and Michigan
courts have recently held nonlawyers who assisted persons in
obtaining divorces to be guilty of the unauthorized practice of
law,5 6 necessarily implying that the courts consider divorce work
to be legal practice. There thus seems no doubt that these lay
divorce firms are indeed practicing law.
The judicially created exceptions to the prohibition of unau-
thorized practice probably do not apply to these divorce firms.
The first exception for general advice distributed as printed matter
where there is no personal contact with the purchaser,57 might
possibly cover the firm selling self-contained kits, providing the
firm were careful to do nothing more than market the kit and had
50 Gordon, Graham & Cramer has had several clients who, for various reasons, have
been denied a divorce by the judge. The practice has been to refund the fee and advise the
client to consult an attorney. No particular lawyer has ever been recommended, however.
51 There is at present no reliable method for evaluating the competence of the people
employed as advisors. Since the Michigan State Bar Association contends that these firms
are illegally practicing law, it will not concern itself with whether the advisors possess
enough knowledge to do the job properly. Inasmuch as no other state agency regulates
these firms, there is currently no check on the quality of their services.
52 A divorce advisor should be as familiar with the law governing divorce as an attorney.
The crucial distinction is that the divorce advisor is a specialist in only that one field and
cannot deal with any other legal problems. If a divorce involves legal issues outside the
area of the advisor's expertise, he must refer it to an attorney.
53 For example, the divorce advisor would probably not be equipped to deal with cases
involving complex property issues or involved settlement disputes. He should, however,
be able to recognize these problems and refer the client to an attorney for assistance.
54 See part IA supra.
5 5 Civil law governing divorce in Michigan dates back at least to 1846 (R.S. 1846, ch.
84, § 6). See also Lee, Divorce Law Reform in Michigan, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 409
(1972).56 See Recent Developments, 28 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws at 100, 317 (1962).
57 See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
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absolutely no personal contact with its customers.5 8 Even if all
personal contact could be avoided, the Michigan courts might well
enjoin sales of such kits because the advice contained therein is of
a highly technical legal nature. 59 In any event, this exception
would not exempt those firms which conduct personal interviews,
probably the more desirable firms from the client's point of view.
The second exception permitting a lay firm to perform legal
services which are incidental to its primary business, 60 clearly
does not apply to divorce firms. Divorce assistance, far from
being incidental, is the sole business of the firms in question.
Another factor operating against the firms is the fact that their
services are, of course, fee-generating. 6 1
It might be argued that lay firms should be permitted to provide
assistance in divorce cases on the basis of the third exception to
the prohibition of unauthorized practice, allowing nonlawyers to
provide legal services where to do so is consistent with a clear
legislative intent.6 2 As one commentator has stated, the No-Fault
Divorce Law is predicated on the belief that "when the marriage
relationship has terminated, granting of the divorce should flow as
an inalienable legal right." 63 Because there would seem to be little
value in instituting major statutory reform to guarantee a right
when the exercise of that right is conditioned upon one's ability to
retain legal counsel, arguably the activities of lay divorce firms are
not only consistent with the legislature's intent in revising the
divorce law, but may in fact be indispensable if the goal of more
readily available divorce is to be achieved.
This argument is far from conclusive, however. The distinction
between ends and means is crucial. One objective of the legisla-
ture was to facilitate the obtaining of a divorce; and while lay
divorce firms are one means of attaining that goal, the legislature
chose a different means, that of simplifying the grounds for di-
vorce. There is no evidence of any intent to permit the activities
of lay divorce firms, and such intent should not lightly be inferred.
58 Although this is possible, a conscientious divorce kit distributor should try to screen
his customers to ensure that the kit is suited to their needs. The resulting contact will,
however, negate his exemption from prosecution for unauthorized practice.
59 The boundaries of this particular exception to unauthorized practice are not yet firmly
established. In formulating more specific guidelines governing its applicability, the com-
plexity of the subject matter will probably become one of the criteria to be considered, just
as it has in the exception of incidental legal services. See notes 32-34 and 38 and
accompanying text supra.
6 0 See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
61 See note 37 supra.
62 See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
63 Honigman, What "No-Fault" Means to Divorce, 51 MICH. ST. B.J. 16, 17 (1972).
WINTER 1973]
Journal of Law Reform
11. DIVORCE FIRMS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW:
POLICY ISSUES
A. The Anatomy of Divorce in Michigan64
Lay divorce firms are designed to render assistance only in
very simple divorce cases. In a typical case the couple would
have no minor children,65 a property settlement would already
have been agreed upon, 6 6 and the divorce itself would not be
contested. 67 This type of case will provide the model for the
following discussion. The attorney's tasks in any divorce action,
whether or not under a no-fault law, may be divided, as may the
work for any law suit, into three categories: (1) investigation of
the facts and preparation of legal arguments, 68 (2) filing of the
proper forms and written motions, 69 and (3) conduct of the trial
itself. Under the No-Fault Divorce Law, 70 the attorney's job
should require less effort and less expertise than was previously
necessary, especially in uncontested cases.
64 Data used in this section were obtained in part by observation of divorce trials in
Washtenaw County Circuit Court, Nov. 16, 1972, and in an interview with Peter J.
Hoffman, Director, University of Michigan Clinical Law Program, in Ann Arbor, Mich.,
Jan. 22, 1973.
6 Gordon, Graham & Cramer did process divorces involving minor children when it
first started doing business but has since stopped doing so under court order. The firm was
ordered to take no more cases involving children at the time suit was filed against it for
unauthorized practice. State Bar of Michigan v. Harold Graham, No. 72-218571-C2
(Wayne County Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 27, 1972). Even if the order is lifted, however, the firm
has determined not to accept any more cases involving children.
Where minor children are involved, special procedures must be utilized to insure that
their interests are being protected. The Friend of the Court investigates and makes a
recommendation concerning custody, visitation privileges, and child support, pursuant to
his authority under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. H 552.251, .252, .252a, .253, and MICH.
CT. RULE 727, in 4 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICH. CT. RULES ANN. (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1972). See note 125 infra.
66 Where there is no real property involved, the parties will often divide up the property
before trial and, in the proposed divorce decree, provide that each party shall retain
whatever property is in his possession. In many cases where the parties have separated
previously, the property is already divided, and the same provision is included in the
decree.
67 Although the defendant can answer the complaint and appear at trial while not
contesting the divorce, more commonly the defendant allows the plaintiff to obtain a
default judgment by not responding to the complaint.
68 Investigation of the facts is taken to include the process of interviewing the client and
any other witnesses, and preparing for the trial. An attorney who is familiar with divorce
law should have to do relatively little legal research unless the case involves unusual
issues.
69 The basic forms which must be filed in an uncontested divorce are a complaint,
summons, proof of service, affidavit that the defendant is not in military service, motion for
default judgment, default judgment, and proposed divorce decree. If there are minor
children involved, the court requires a recommendation from the Friend of the Court and
there may be additional paper work involved. MICH. CT. RULE 727, in 4 J. HONIGMAN &
C. HAWKINS, MICH. CT. RULES ANN. (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972). See note 125
infra.
70 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1972).
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1. Investigation and Preparation of the Case- Prior to filing
suit, the lawyer must determine whether there is a basis for
maintaining the action. To fulfill the basic requirement of jurisdic-
tion in divorce actions in Michigan, the plaintiff must have been a
resident of the State for at least one year 71 and of the county in
which the court sits for at least ten days prior to filing suit.72
Before the institution of the No-Fault Divorce Law, the plaintiff
was required to plead a specific ground for the divorce, 73 the most
common of which were extreme cruelty, desertion, failure to
provide support, adultery, and habitual drunkenness. 74 It was
necessary to discover some improper behavior of the other spouse
on which to base the request for divorce.
The plaintiff faced another serious problem prior to the in-
stitution of no-fault divorce. A suit for divorce was in equity, and
the "clean hands" doctrine posed an obstacle in many cases. 75
Under this theory, a court of equity would only grant relief to a
plaintiff who was himself innocent of any misconduct. In uncon-
tested cases, this problem was often solved by concealing the fact
of the plaintiffs wrongdoing from the court. Nevertheless, it was a
problem of which attorneys had to be aware.
Under the No-Fault Divorce Law, the sole ground for divorce
is a total breakdown of the marriage. 76 The court must satisfy
71 Id. § 552.9(l). Id. § 552.9(2) excuses the one year residency requirement if the parties
were married in Michigan within the last twelve months and have continuously resided in
Michigan since the date of their marriage.
72 Id. § 552.9(3).
73 MICH. REV. STAT. OF 1846, ch. 84, § 6, as amended MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
552.6 (Supp. 1972), provided:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be decreed by the circuit court
of the county where the parties, or I of them, reside, or by the court of
chancery, on the application by petition, in either of the following cases:
I. Whenever adultery has been committed by any husband or wife;
2. When I of the parties was physically incompetent at the time of the
marriage;
3. When I of the parties has been sentenced to imprisonment in any
prison, jail or house of correction for 3 years or more, and no pardon granted
to the party so sentenced, after a divorce for that cause, shall restore such
party to his or her conjugal rights;
4. When either party shall desert the other for the term of 2 years;
5. When the husband or wife shall have become an habitual drunkard;
6. And the circuit courts may, in their discretion, upon application, as in
other cases, divorce from the bonds of matrimony any party who is a resident
of this state, and whose husband or wife shall have obtained a divorce in any
other state.
74 Honigman, supra note 63, at 16.
75 Under the "clean hands" doctrine, a court will grant a divorce only where the
complaining spouse is innocent of any misconduct. For a discussion of this doctrine (also
referred to as "recrimination"), see Freed, Defenses Against Divorce in French and
American Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 303, 307-311(1960).
76 MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1972) provides:
(I) A complaint for divorce may be filed in the circuit court upon the
allegation that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the
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itself that the marital relationship has in fact ceased to exist and
should also be convinced that there is no realistic possibility of
reconciliation. A temporary breakdown is not sufficient grounds
for divorce. The breakdown must be total and permanent. Thus
the new law reflects not so much a legalistic approach but rather
the approach that a marriage counselor might take, looking not, as
previously, for specific misconduct but rather to the state of the
marriage as a whole.
2. Forms and Motions in a Divorce Case-There has also
been some simplification of the forms to be filed with the court.
Most forms remain the same as before the No-Fault Divorce Law
took effect, but these should present no problem even to a lay-
man. 77 The only change is in the grounds for divorce which must
be alleged in the complaint. 78 Whereas previously the complaint
had to allege the specific grounds for the divorce 79 and there was
a danger of variance between proof and pleading,80 under the
No-Fault Divorce Law the complaint in a divorce must allege
extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains
no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. In the complaint
the plaintiff shall make no other explanation of the grounds for divorce than
by the use of the statutory language.
(2) The defendant, by answer, may either admit the grounds for divorce
alleged or deny them without further explanation. An admission by the
defendant of the grounds for divorce is not binding on the court's determina-
tion.
(3) The court shall enter a judgment dissolving the bonds of matrimony if
evidence is presented in open court that there has been a breakdown in the
marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been
destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can
be preserved.
For a general discussion and evaluation of Michigan's new divorce law, see Honigman,
supra note 63; Snyder, Divorce Michigan Style- 1972 and Beyond, 50 MICH. ST. B.J. 740
(197 1). Mr. Honigman is Chairman of the Michigan Law Revision Commission which
proposed the new law. Mr. Snyder is Chairman of the Family Law Committee of the State
Bar of Michigan which opposed it. See the report of the family law committee at 50 MIcH.
ST. B.J. 534, 537 (1971). See also Lee, supra note 55.
77 These forms can and have been standardized (by Gordon, Graham & Cramer and the
University of Michigan Clinical Law Program, among others) so that the plaintiff need
only fill in a few blanks, sign the forms in the presence of a notary public, and file them
with the court clerk. The only possible area of difficulty might be in serving the complaint
on the defendant, but if the divorce is desired by both parties the defendant's cooperation
eliminates this problem.
78 The complaint must also allege the court's jurisdiction (see notes 71 and 72 and
accompanying text supra), that the parties are legally married, and that the wife is not
pregnant. If the wife is pregnant the divorce will not be granted until the child is born. In
this manner the court can assure itself that the child's needs are provided for. These
allegations, however, are easily provided for in a standardized form.
79 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
80 For example, if the plaintiff alleged desertion as the grounds for divorce, proof of
extreme cruelty would not suffice. Most judges would, however, probably have allowed the
plaintiff to amend the complaint to conform to the proof. Alleging several grounds initially
provided another safeguard against this type of error.
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only the total breakdown of the marriage relationship"' and any
proof the plaintiff presents must tend to prove the breakdown. a2
Thus, the chance of erring by citing the wrong grounds in a
divorce complaint has been substantially reduced, for the plaintiff
need only copy the words directly from the statute.83
3. Trial of a Divorce Case- The final stage of a divorce suit is
the hearing in open court. In an uncontested case, the testimony is
brief and very simple, often requiring less than ten minutes.a8 The
plaintiff takes the stand, identifies himself, and establishes the
court's jurisdiction. 5 He then states that the marital relationship
has broken down beyond any hope of reconciliation and normally
gives a short example to support this statement.8 6 The question of
why the marriage has failed is not raised, nor is any attempt made
to place the blame on either spouse.8 7 If the plaintiff wishes to
testify without having an attorney present, his testimony can be
condensed to a single page and read to the court.8a At the close of
the direct examination, the judge may ask a few questions of the
witness before he steps down. 89 Normally no additional witnesses
are called.90
B. The Competence of Paraprofessional
Advisors in Divorce Cases
Interest in the use of lay personnel for doing simple legal work
has increased dramatically in recent years.91 Paraprofessionals
8' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(I) (Supp. 1972). This allegation is both necessary
and exclusive. No other grounds may be alleged. See also Honigman, supra note 63, at 21.82 See Honigman, supra note 63, at 20- 21.
83 Of course, if the plaintiff failed to allege the statutory grounds his complaint would be
defective. Yet because there is no longer any need to choose between alternative grounds,
the chance of error is greatly diminished.
84 Honigman, supra note 63, at 22, estimates that testimony in uncontested no-fault
divorce cases should require no more than the "ten minutes previously prevalent." That
duration "will be enough for a spouse to testify in broad terms that he or she has been
unhappy in the marriage, that the parties have in fact separated, and at least one of them is
unwilling to resume the marital relationship."
81 See notes 7 1 and 72 and accompanying text supra.
86 Statements to the effect that the couple was separated and did not intend to reconcile
or that they were living independent lives and intended to continue doing so were consid-
ered sufficient in cases observed by the author.
87 See Honigman, supra note 63, at 20- 22.
8 Gordon, Graham & Cramer has a one page form on which the client fills in several
blanks. The client then reads this statement as his testimony in court, which appears to be
virtually the same as the testimony observed by the author.
89 The witness may be asked once again if the marriage has broken down to the point
that there is no chance of reconciliation and whether the wife is pregnant. The plaintiff,
moreover, may state that all property issues have been settled and that his right to alimony
has knowingly been waived.
:o See Honigman, supra note 63, at 22.
9 1 See generally Turner, Effective Use of Lay Personnel, 38 J.B.A. KAN. 301 (1969);
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have been employed both to ease the workloads of attorneys and
to provide efficient legal services at a lower cost.9 2 The ideal area
for using lay assistants is one in which the work is processed in
quantity and is relatively simple, and where standardized proce-
dures can easily be established.93
Divorce, especially under a no-fault law, is certainly such an
area. Many firms which deal with divorces do so in substantial
quantity, and legal aid clinics almost invariably process large
numbers of divorce cases. 9 4 It is also apparent that the legal
knowledge necessary to process an uncontested divorce suit un-
der Michigan's No-Fault Divorce Law is relatively simple. The
first stage of the case, that of investigating the facts and preparing
the legal arguments, is much less complex under the new law than
was previously true.95 Basically, one need only find evidence that
the marriage has permanently broken down? 6 While the parties'
agreement concerning the breakdown may not be conclusive,9 7 it
is strong evidence that the marriage has failed. The fact of a long
separation also constitutes strong proof. The more technical legal
issues of whether the defendant's conduct falls under one or more
of the criteria enumerated under the fault-oriented law and wheth-
er the plaintiff has also committed such a breach of marital duty
have disappeared. Strict guidelines for proof of a marital break-
down do not exist. A layman should be able to determine whether
the circumstances indicate a defunct marriage, and a great legal
expertise may in fact be of little value today.
Compliance with the technical requirements such as filing the
proper forms and serving process also require only slight legal
skill. 98 The procedure is straightforward and the risk of erroneous
decisions giving rise to later complications has been minimized. A
layman with a small amount of training should be able to perform
the task satisfactorily.
The final step in a divorce suit is the trial. The proof, being of a
more general nature, under the new law requires less expertise in
its presentation. Previously the plaintiff risked the danger that
I
Holme, Paralegals and Sublegals: Aides to the Legal Profession, 46 DENVER L.J. 392
(1969); UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORP., PARAPROFESSIONALS IN LEGAL SERVICES PRO-
GRAMS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (1968) [hereinafter cited as PARAPROFESSIONALS].
92 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 91 (private law office); PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note
91 (legal aid clinics).
93 See Turner, supra note 91; Holme, supra note 9 1, at 405- 17.
94 One study estimates that divorce accounts for approximately 50 percent of the
caseloads of legal aid clinics. PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 9 1, at 89.95 See part I IA I supra.
96 Honigman, supra note 63, at 18-22.9 7 1d.at 22; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(2) (Supp. 1972).
91 See part II A 2 supra.
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evidence of his own misconduct would be introduced, thus barring
relief.99 Arguably someone untrained in the law would be unable
to render reliable advice as to what activities of the plaintiff would
prevent the divorce from being granted should evidence of the
activities to introduced at trial. Under the No-Fault Divorce Law,
however, the only evidence that might bar the granting of the
divorce would be evidence suggesting the possibility of reconcilia-
tion between the parties. 10 Presumably, without legal training one
should be able to distinguish between facts indicating a total
breakdown of the marriage and those indicating possible reconci-
liation.
The idea of using paraprofessional assistance in divorce work is
not new. 10 Nonlegal assistants are already employed for this
purpose in both private law firms and legal services programs. 0 2
In California, which also has a no-fault divorce law, a legal aid
clinic employing paralegals for divorce work reports that a typical
divorce case requires approximately seven minutes of attorney
time.' 03 The nonlawyer divorce specialist conducts the interviews
and drafts the petitions, subject to a lawyer's supervision. 10 4 Ad-
vocates of the utilization of lay help often assume that such help
should be employed only in lawyers' offices. Perhaps this restric-
tion is included in these proposals as a tactical concession to
lessen the expected opposition from the organized bar, but there
may also be a substantial fear of allowing nonlawyers to process
such work without having a trained lawyer present to guide their
work and to take charge should complications arise. These dan-
gers, however, seem minimal in the case of uncontested no-fault
divorces. The work is sufficiently routine that a lawyer's expertise
is unlikely to be needed, and there is no reason to believe that a
properly trained layman would become any more lax in his work
than would an attorney.105 Should complications arise, a lawyer
could always be brought into the case. 106
99 See text accompanying note 75 supra. See also Honigman, supra note 63, at 16- 17.
100See note 76 and accompanying text supra. Since there is no longer any attempt to
place the blame for the failure of the marriage on only one of the parties, the clean hands
doctrine should no longer bar consideration of the other facts of the case.
101 See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
102 See note 91 supra.
1 3 See PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 9 1, at 67.
1
0 41d. at 89- 113.
105 One argument against allowing unauthorized practice is that attorneys have a greater
sense of responsibility. While this may be true in some cases, there is no reason to believe
that a properly trained paralegal would not be equally responsible. Comment, supra note
42.
106 Although lawyers may prefer to enter a case at its inception, if proper records are
.kept this should not prove to be a serious problem in the few cases in which the need for a
lawyer develops.
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Certainly there is some danger involved in allowing nonlawyers
to practice without supervision, and perhaps an attorney should
be available even in the simplest of cases. 10 7 Unfortunately, at
this time no lawyer would be willing to work for a lay divorce firm
because by doing so he would violate the American Bar Associ-
ation's Code of Professional Responsibility, i08 thereby risking
disbarment.10 9 The fact remains, however, that such difficulties
are not the product of any inherent inability on the part of the
paraprofessional to perform adequately the routine work in simple
divorce cases. On the contrary, it appears that the special ex-
pertise of the lawyer is simply not essential for such work and that
properly trained and supervised nonlawyers could easily handle
uncomplicated divorce actions.
This conclusion, of course, does not end the inquiry. Such
arrangements, even though feasible, may nevertheless prove un-
desirable. An intelligent appraisal of current restrictions upon the
operations of lay divorce firms requires consideration of their
potential costs and benefits to the public, in light of the goals and
values served by the laws prohibiting unauthorized practice.
C. Policy Considerations Regarding
Paraprofessional Divorce Firm Operations
The arguments for strictly controlling the unauthorized practice
of law seem to fall into two categories, emphasizing the potential
harm either to the public or to the legal profession. Injury to the
profession may be further subdivided either as economic or as
directed toward the integrity of the bar.
1. The Economic Threat-Certainly lawyers have a direct
financial interest in restricting entry by paraprofessionals into the
areas currently designated as constituting the practice of law. The
economics of supply and demand in the area of legal services
suggest that the less legal assistance available, the higher the price
of that legal assistance is likely to be. Thus, by restricting entry
into his field, the divorce practitioner may theoretically maintain
an artificially high price for his services. Although there is a
107 This can be accomplished by requiring lay divorce firms to employ a staff attorney.
Gordon, Graham & Cramer initially planned to include an attorney on the staff but
abandoned the idea when unable to find one who was willing to join.
108
"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 3-10 1(A). "A lawyer shall
not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of
the practice of law." Id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 3-103(A).
109 RULE 15, RULES CONCERNING THE STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, in MICHIGAN COURT
RULES(SUpp. 1972).
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reluctance among lawyers to articulate this as a legitimate policy
goal, 1 10 it is a potentially significant factor. 1 '
Several arguments can be marshalled against this position. Per-
haps the most basic is the general recognition that such protec-
tionism is simply not a legitimate public value sufficient to justify
its judicial enforcement. Furthermore, to the extent that other
reasons serve in part as rationalizations for the underlying mo-
tives of self-protection, it should be noted that lay divorce firms
are in any event unlikely to affect significantly the incomes of
most lawyers. Many attorneys who do specialize in divorce work
are unlikely to be seriously affected by divorce firms because
these firms deal with only the simplest cases, in which the parties
have already agreed on all the details and are merely seeking to
add legal sanction to their own dissolution of the marriage. Where
there is considerable property involved, agreement on a set-
tlement is less likely, even in uncontested cases. The divorce
firms' clientele should be mainly young and lower income couples
without substantial amounts of money or other property." 2 Li-
censed practitioners should continue to attract clients with prob-
lems concerning related matters such as property settlements,
alimony, and child custody." 3
2. The Integrity of the Bar-There is a less obvious but equally
basic threat to the legal profession in the unauthorized practice of
110 Professional aggrandizement is often denied by lawyers in favor of a case based upon
the public harm of unauthorized practice. See Marden, The American Bar and Unautho-
rized Practice, 33 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS, Spring-Summer, 1967, at 2:
That is why we are here today, to talk about the way the lines are
currently being drawn between lawyers and others. Our concern in this
matter is governed by broad considerations of social policy and the public
interest. It must not be motivated by selfishness, by competition-
for-competition's sake, or by avaricious materialism. The lawyer who thinks
that unauthorized practice work is simply a means for increasing his own
income has no place in this discussion.
We are here to protect the public from the hidden dangers of dealing with
the unlicensed and unauthorized practitioner; not to protect the lawyer from
competition. We are not a trade union, and we must beware of giving the
appearance of acting for our selfish interests when we attack the illegal
practitioner.
M An excellent illustration is contained in Legal Business That Goes Outside the
Profession, 34 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS, Spring, 1968, at 25:
We're talking about the legal business that's being handled every day by
non-lawyers who provide legal services as "fringe benefits" as an inducement
to clients or customers. The banker, the real estate agent and broker, the
insurance man, the accountant, the tax specialist and even the notary pub-
lic-all get a big chunk of the practice that should be handled by the
practicing attorney within the confines of the lawyer's office.
This is a serious economic problem affecting the legal profession as a
whole.
112 These groups as a whole tend not to turn to lawyers for assistance. PARA-
PROFESSIONALS, supra note 91, at 7.
113 Involved property settlements, alimony settlements, and child custody issues are
sufficiently complex that lawyers will usually be consulted.
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law because it both devalues the intangible attributes of the pro-
fession like exclusive claim to specialized knowledge and weakens
its institutional framework by operating outside the control of bar
associations. Thus, in a very fundamental sense, the prohibition of
unauthorized practice is a necessary concomitant of the organized
bar. 114 Once again, however, it is possible that lay divorce firms
represent no real threat to the profession. The integrity of the bar
is seriously at issue only in the face of truly substantial encroach-
ments by nonmembers. Purely as a matter of degree, divorce firms
would affect only a relatively small portion of what is presently
viewed as the practice of law. Yet these firms may be important
simply as symbols of lay encroachment, as encouragement for
further attacks on the professional citadel. In view of the public
interest in a strong and viable bar,115 such factors may weigh
somewhat more heavily than the purely economic concerns.
3. The Public Interest-The primary rationale for the prohibi-
tion of the unauthorized practice of law is to protect the public
from the potential harm of incorrect or misleading advice.11 6 The
judiciary and the organized bar are charged with the task of
providing this protection. 117 There are other values, however,
which supplement and compete with this goal and may affect the
means for its attainment.
The public interest in the practice of law assumes two
conflicting forms. The requirement of protection from unskilled
practitioners who may give incorrect or incomplete advice must
be balanced against the need for the easy availability of in-
expensive legal assistance. The former is achieved primarily
through regulations limiting the practice of law to certain qualified
persons, but such quality controls necessarily reduce the quantity
of available assistance by restricting the number of practitioners.
The major cost, or undesirable effect, of permitting lay divorce
firms is the danger that erroneous or incomplete advice will be
given to clients. In light of the relatively simple nature of divorce
under the no-fault law, that risk is small, and a minimum of
training should be needed to equip lay personnel not only to deal
11 4See, e.g., Onion, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
NEWS 271, at 271 (1959): '[T]he prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law is
coextensive with the very existence of the legal profession itself." See also Note, supra
note 42, at 215; Comment, supra note 42.
115 "The practice of law by unqualified persons antedated the organized bar. The bar
arose as a result of a public demand for the exclusion of those who assume to practice law
without adequate qualification." Note, supra note 42 at 215. The bar's primary functions
today are still to limit the practice of law to qualified practitioners and to regulate the
conduct of those practitioners.
116 See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
'
17See notes 9-23 and accompanying text supra.
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with simple divorce cases successfully but also to recognize more
complex problems which require a lawyer's attention. 118 It is also
possible that the existence of lay divorce firms will reduce the
organized bar's control over the practice of law not merely in this
area but in other areas as well, 119 greatly hindering that body's
efforts to protect the public from dangers of unauthorized prac-
tice. Nevertheless, a carefully planned system for regulation of
these lay firms should vest sufficient control in the bar so that its
power is not seriously diminished. Furthermore, lay divorce firms
potentially offer important benefits to the public. Permitting such
firms to operate would certainly increase the availability of di-
vorce assistance. This, combined with the lesser amount of train-
ing required for lay divorce advisors as compared with that re-
quired for lawyers, should lead to lower costs for divorce assis-
tance. If proper control is exercised to prevent the dissemination
of improper advice, the benefits of these firms seem to outweigh
their costs, and they should be allowed to provide their services.
III. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Since it appears that lay divorce firms may be able to function
successfully, yielding a net benefit to the public, they should be
given the opportunity to prove their value and efficiency. Yet
because their operation does entail certain risks, their public ben-
efit is premised upon the maintenance of certain standards of
performance. The judiciary and the organized bar have assumed
the responsibility for protecting the public from unskilled prac-
titioners, but these bodies should also perform this task in a
manner which is most beneficial to the public. Neither total ex-
clusion of divorce firms through prosecution for unauthorized
practice nor a policy of complete noninterference is an acceptable
solution.
The state and local bar associations in Michigan have demon-
strated strong animosity toward the lay divorce firms, and the
judiciary has shown a willingness to enjoin the operation of such
firms. 120 It seems, however, that the organized bar should refrain
from relying solely on the relatively easy remedy of unauthorized
practice prosecutions and instead seek new and innovative
remedies to the problem of nonlawyers encroaching on areas tra-
ditionally viewed as the exclusive province of lawyers. The State
"18 Seepart I IA supra.
119See part II C 2 supra.
120See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
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Bar of Michigan should establish a new committee to regulate lay
divorce firms to ensure that the public will be protected. Firms
not complying with the regulations promulgated by this committee
would then be subject to prosecution for the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. The committee's primary task would be to determine
the types of cases these firms may process. The simplest cases, in
which agreement has been reached on all matters prior to filing
suit, are no longer adversary proceedings and clearly can be
processed by the lay firms. 121 If the property settlement stipulated
by the parties is complex, an attorney should draw up that portion
of the agreement. The remainder of the work can be performed by
the divorce firm.' 22
If -the divorce itself or the settlement is disputed, the parties
should not be allowed to use the services of a lay firm,' ap for the
divorce suit then becomes an adversary proceeding1 24 and the
parties should have skilled legal counsel who will represent their
interests and protect their rights. Divorce firms are designed to
offer advice on the procedural aspects of a divorce and are not
equipped to represent parties in the capacity required in contested
cases. A question does arise as to those cases involving minor
children, even where custody and visitation rights have been
worked out between the spouses. The parties must meet with the
Friend of the Court, who then makes a recommendation to the
court. 25 The major factor against allowing lay firms to handle
121 An English study of divorce law reports:
Under a law based on breakdown, the trial of a divorce case becomes in
some respects analogous to a coroner's inquest, in that its object would be
judicial inquiry into the alleged fact and causes of the "death" of a marriage
relationship.
LONDON S.P.C.K., PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
67 (1966). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1972); Recommendations of
the Michigan Law Revision Commission Relating to the Revision of the Grounds for
Divorce, in Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Michigan's New No-Fault Divorce
Law 2, 5 (unpublished course materials, 1971).12 2 See part 11A supra.
'2This should apply whenever there is any kind of a dispute, whether over the issue of
the divorce or the terms of the property settlement. If denying access to a divorce firm acts
as an incentive for parties to settle (thereby avoiding the need to consult an attorney), this
would perhaps be a desirable side effect.
124 See, e.g., Honigman, supra note 63, at 22:
Certainly if the parties are not in dispute as to alimony, custody or property
settlement, it would clearly be a pro confesso situation. If the grounds for
divorce have been admitted but there are nonetheless unresolved disputes as
to alimony, property settlement or child custody, it should be deemed a
contested action ....
12 The Friend of the Court is an officer of the court and does not represent either party.
His job is to seek the best result for the child. Although the parties' decision concerning
the child is a major factor, it is not binding on the Friend of the Court, and it is possible
that he will reject it. Judges rely quite heavily on his recommendation, and contesting it is a
difficult process. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.251, .252, .253 (1967), § 552.252a
(Supp. 1972); MICH. CT. RULE 727, in 4 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICH. CT. RULES
ANN. (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
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these cases is the gravity of the decision involved. A decision to
give up custody or accept limited visitation privileges can have
very serious consequences and should be made only with a full
understanding of the rights involved. Should divorce firms prove
to be an efficient and capable source of legal advice, they may in
the future be permitted to expand the scope of their operations to
include such cases.
An additional requirement which might be appropriate would
be the retention of a staff attorney. He could oversee the work,
advise lay employees when necessary, and take over the case if
serious complications arose. Of course, if a dispute arose between
the parties, the divorce firm would have to advise them both to
consult outside attorneys in order to avoid a conflict of interest
problem. The staff lawyer would then be responsible for assem-
bling the data on the case and making it available to the newly
retained attorneys.126
Divorce firms could offer another advantage by providing some
type of counselor to deal with the emotional aspects of a divorce.
Prominent divorce lawyers agree that a substantial portion of their
work is of a nonlegal nature.12 7 A psychologist or other nonlawyer
trained to deal with emotional problems could probably perform
better in this area. Perhaps requiring lay divorce firms to employ a
trained counselor is overly restrictive, but such a practice should
certainly be strongly suggested. 28
Finally, the bar committee should require divorce advisors to
meet certain qualifications. Examinations can be used to test the
applicant's knowledge of divorce law, and acceptable candidates
could receive certification.1 29 Standardized forms and procedural
outlines should be prepared or approved by the committee. These
steps should be sufficient to protect the public from the danger of
receiving erroneous advice from unskilled practitioners.
The judiciary also has the power to control legal practice, and
while it has gratefully acknowledged guidelines established by
other bodies,' 30 it has also indicated a clear intent not to
relinquish its inherent power in this area.13 ' An integral part of
126Although a client's communications to his lay advisor would not fall under the
attorney-client privilege, it still might be desirable to screen the information before releas-
ing it.
'27 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
128 1t should be noted that requiring a staff attorney and a marriage counselor might
produce too heavy a burden for small firms or else necessitate sharply increased fees,
thereby eliminating a major advantage of divorce firms. Since lawyers process divorces
without employing a special counselor, such a requirement perhaps should be imposed on
lay firms only if it proves financially feasible.
129 Certification could also require a showing of good moral character and responsibility.
13'See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
3 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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any program allowing lay divorce firms to operate would be a
revision of the Michigan Supreme Court Rules regarding unautho-
rized practice. 132 Although the desired result could be obtained by
allowing practice by any person who has received the official
approval of the state bar committee, this is probably too broad
and perhaps even an invalid delegation of judicial power. 133 Al-
ternatively, a provision authorizing qualified lay persons to render
advice in simple uncontested divorce cases would accomplish the
immediate goal while doing very little to facilitate future changes
in the rules which may prove desirable. 134 In view of the com-
paratively new and untested nature of the concept of allowing
regulated lay firms to render legal advice, the latter approach
seems preferable at present.
By adopting a program such as that outlined above, the
judiciary and the bar can attain the goal of protecting the public
without sacrificing the potential benefit from lay divorce firms. Of
course, the suggestions offered here are merely tentative, and
considerable effort will be necessary if this plan is to be effective.
Yet the apparent need of the public for low-cost legal assistance
makes it imperative that the organized bar seek new and in-
novative remedies to the problem of the unauthorized practice of
law by laymen.
-Arthur R. Miller
132 See part I A supra.
13 If the Supreme Court Rules were to bind lower courts to accept the Bar's decisions
on authorized practice, this ruling might amount to a delegation of judicial power to the
State Bar.
134 The same process of changing the rules would have to occur again to accomodate
future policy changes. The recommended revisions, except for possibly having removed a
barrier against innovation and established a precedent, would do little to facilitate future
revisions of the rules.
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